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Introduction
It has been just two and a half years since the new President of Myanmar, Thein Sein, came to power in March 
2011. At the time, many within the international community were (at best) skeptical that an ex-General could un-
dertake the massive reform effort that would be needed to bring Myanmar back into the international community. 
However, after a cautious response in 2011, in 2012 the international community, acknowledging the very real, 
concrete reforms being undertaken, began to reengage with the Myanmar government. By 2013, this reengagement 
had become a torrent of visits, agreements and press conferences. After 25 years of international sanctions and the 
DFFRPSDQ\LQJYLOL¿FDWLRQ0\DQPDULVQRZthe destination of choice for the world’s political and business elites. 
Donors of development aid too, have been swept along in this new “rush for Myanmar”. Almost all OECD donors 
KDYHERWKGUDPDWLFDOO\XSJUDGHGWKHLULQFRXQWU\RI¿FHVDQGVLJQL¿FDQWO\LQFUHDVHGWKHLUDLGEXGJHWVIRU0\DQPDU
This paper will investigate this “rush for Myanmar” by focusing on two multilateral donors, the World Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank, and one bilateral donor, Japan.
7KHVHGRQRUVKDYHEHHQVHOHFWHGIRUDQXPEHURIUHDVRQV-DSDQKDVDORQJKLVWRU\RISURYLGLQJVLJQL¿FDQWDLG
to Myanmar. It was the number one donor to Myanmar during the entire Cold War period. Yet, Japan also has its 
own particular set of circumstances that determine its foreign policy towards Myanmar, the prime one of which is 
FRXQWHULQJWKHµ5LVHRI&KLQD¶7KURXJKRXWWKHVDQFWLRQVHUDWKLVKDVUHVXOWHGLQ-DSDQWDNLQJDVLJQL¿FDQWO\GLIIHU-
ent approach than that of most other OECD countries, especially the US and EU members states. Indeed, it could 
be said that the US and the EU are now following the type of ‘constructive engagement’ policy that Japan has long 
advocated. The World Bank and Asian Development Bank have been selected because they will invariably play 
a crucial role in Myanmar’s transition, and also because, being multilateral donors they have similar institutional 
restraints, whilst also having somewhat different perspectives and imperatives.
:KLOHWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\KDVEHHQMXVWL¿DEO\FDXWLRXVLQLWVGLSORPDWLFUHVSRQVHWRWKHORQJRYHUGXH
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‘opening up’ of Myanmar, this is just one aspect of the process of reengaging with Myanmar. Since the initial out-
break of the prodemocracy movement in Myanmar, the sanctions became steadily more comprehensive over the 
\HDUV7KHVHVDQFWLRQVDUHLQIDFWDIRUPDOERWWOHQHFNWRHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWWKHVSHFL¿HGSXUSRVHRIZKLFKLV
WRUHVWULFWWKHÀRZRIUHVRXUFHVLQWR0\DQPDU8QGRLQJWKHVHVDQFWLRQVLVWKHUHIRUHDNLQWRRYHUFRPLQJWKH¿UVW
international bottleneck that is hindering economic development in Myanmar.
Needless to say, during the 20-plus years between the beginning of sanctions in 1988–1990, and the opening 
up of Myanmar that began in 2011, the amount of ODA received by Myanmar was minimal. As we can see from 
Figure  1, whilst ODA to Myanmar in the years 1980–1987 averaged about US$330 million a year, in the next 
twenty years between 1989 and 2007, it averaged just US$86 million. Needless to say, this is a direct result, indeed 
the purpose of the sanctions policy.
Arguably, one other result of the sanctions policy was the dramatic deterioration in public health in Myanmar 
during the 1990s. Whilst it must be recognized that public health is the responsible of the government, the ex-
tremely limited humanitarian aid, as well as the intentioned squeeze on the government budget (that was anyway 
prioritizing military spending), directly led to the public health crisis that began to emerge in the early 2000s. 
,QGLFDWRUVIRUDQXPEHURIKLJKSULRULW\DQGKLJKSUR¿OH0LOOHQQLXP'HYHORSPHQW*RDOV0'*VVXFKDV,QIDQW
and Under-5 Mortality, showed that Myanmar was performing comparatively worse than its peers1). Figures for 
the incidence of HIV/AIDS and malaria also indicated that public health in Myanmar was in a considerably poorer 
condition than in other countries at similar levels of development.
In response to this crisis, some members of the international donor community did in fact increase ODA to 
0\DQPDUDQGWKLVLVWKHUHDVRQIRUWKHVOLJKWLQFUHDVHLQWKH¿UVWIHZ\HDUVRIWKHst century, as shown in Figure  1 
EHORZ7KH*OREDO)XQGWR)LJKW$,'67XEHUFXORVLVDQG0DODULD*)$70EHJDQ¿QDQFLQJ81'3SURJUDPV
in the early 2000s. Britain began also to increase its ODA from about £1 million in 2000 to £5 million a year in 
2004–6.
However, in terms of international assistance to the people of Myanmar, it was to take more than the slow 
creep of a public health crisis to spur action. The real tipping point came with cyclone Nargis in 2008. This was 
Figure  1: Total ODA to Myanmar, 1980–2011 (Net ODA, US$ millions current prices)
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the natural disaster that showed the world not just how low relations between the international community and 
Myanmar had become, but also vividly highlighted the consequences of such poor relations. It was only after the 
LQWHUYHQWLRQRI816*%DQNL0RRQWKDWWKH0\DQPDUJRYHUQPHQWDOORZHGWKHODUJHVFDOHLQÀRZRIIRUHLJQDV-
sistance. Importantly also, this natural disaster showed the Burmese leadership itself just how bad governance had 
become in their country. President Thein Sein later said that he was shocked at both how ill prepared the govern-
ment was, and at how poor their response was.
)LJXUHVKRZVWKHGUDPDWLFGHFOLQHLQ2I¿FLDO'HYHORSPHQW$VVLVWDQFH2'$WR0\DQPDUDIWHU7KH
rise to nearly US$200 million in 1995 was due to a large debt relief grant from Japan. This debt relief grant was 
part of the Japanese government’s ‘constructive engagement’ policy towards Myanmar, in that it was intended to 
both prevent Myanmar from going into arrears and to reward positive political developments in Myanmar, which 
in 1995 included the release from house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi.
ODA: Theoretical Rationale
The role of the state in economic development has long been debated, although with the rise of the so-called 
“Washington Consensus” in the 1980s, the predominant view has been one of assuming that market forces drive 
JURZWKDQGWKDWWKHVWDWHLPSHGHVWKHHI¿FLHQWRSHUDWLRQRIVXFKIRUFHV+RZHYHUWKHVXFFHVVRIWKH(DVW$VLDQ
model of economic development, and Japan’s role in this model provides a clear and compelling alternative model. 
Even the World Bank itself, in its 1993 report, The East Asian Model: Economic Growth and Public Policy, con-
cluded that the extensive role of the state in the economies of East Asian countries had contributed to their success2).
The economist Jeffrey Sachs has long-argued that public investment is necessary for economic growth. It underpins 
private sector investment by providing public goods, such as infrastructure and education, which the private sec-
tor is unable to provide, especially in developing countries3). On the assumption that capital is in relatively short 
VXSSO\LQDGHYHORSLQJFRXQWU\VXFKSXEOLFJRRGVPXVWEH¿QDQFHGE\IRUHLJQFDSLWDODQGWKHFKHDSHVWIRUPRI
IRUHLJQFDSLWDODYDLODEOHWRGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHVLVJHQHUDOO\2I¿FLDO'HYHORSPHQW$VVLVWDQFH2'$IURP2(&'
donor countries and International Financial Institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank and the Asian Development 
Bank. Parenthetically, before the current reform effort and the lifting of sanctions, the government of Myanmar’s 
SULPDU\VRXUFHRIIRUHLJQ¿QDQFHZDVWKH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI&KLQD,WKDVEHHQZLGHO\UHFRJQL]HGWKDW-DSDQHVH
ODA has played a key role in providing the infrastructure that facilitated the private investments of Japanese busi-
nesses in East Asian countries, which in turn enabled such countries to successfully pursue export-led economic 
growth strategies4)7KLVH[SHULHQFHFRXSOHGZLWKWKHLPSHUDWLYHWRFRXQWHU&KLQHVHLQÀXHQFHLQ0\DQPDUKDYH
long provided the foundation for engagement with the government of Myanmar. However, while Myanmar will 
LQYDULDEO\EHLQQHHGRIIRUHLJQ¿QDQFHWRVXSSRUWLWVHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWWKLVQHHGHQWDLOVPXFKPRUHWKDQ
merely the provision of capital.
With its current reforms, Myanmar is now the latest country to join a long list of “countries in transition”, a 
term initially used to refer to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe after the break up of the Soviet Union. 
,Q(DVW$VLD&DPERGLD&KLQD/DRVDQG9LHWQDPDUHLGHQWL¿HGE\WKH,0)DVEHLQJLQWUDQVLWLRQ%HFDXVHWKLV
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term refers to the economic transition from a planned economy to a market economy, it involves the immense task 
of reforming the legal system and building new public and private institutions. Governance, of the new market 
economy, as well as of the reform process itself will be a key issue.
The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators rank Myanmar in the bottom 10% of 215 economies, 
for “Government Effectiveness”, “Regulatory Quality”, “Rule of law”, and “Control of Corruption”5). These 
Governance indicators represent the capacity of the government to provide services to its citizens. Years of mili-
WDU\UXOHSULRULWLVHGPLOLWDU\RYHUQRQPLOLWDU\LQVWLWXWLRQVDQGPLOLWDU\RI¿FHUVPDQDJHPRVWQRQPLOLWDU\SXEOLF
institutions. The priority given to the military is a common result of military rule, and it has been estimated that 
upwards of 40% of the national budget went to the military6). However, outside of the military, the provision of 
public services is extremely limited, and this has drastically reduced trust between the state and the citizenry. The 
restoration of this trust requires strong signals of real change, which must include the expansion of government 
services. It is here that international assistance can be of value to the reform process, although it must be recognised 
WKDWWKHUHDUHQRµTXLFN¿[HV¶
According to the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report, “It took the 20 fastest-moving countries an 
average of 17 years to get the military out of politics, 20 years to achieve functioning bureaucratic quality, and 27 
years to bring corruption under reasonable control”. The same report advocates a minimum of 15-years of inter-
national assistance as being necessary to support most long-term institutional transformations7).
The economist Paul Collier has argued convincingly that ODA “can potentially help turnarounds” in three 
ways; as an incentive, in building up skills through technical assistance (TA), and as a reinforcement (in the later 
years of the reform process)8). Collier argues that ODA in the form of Technical Assistance “has a big favourable 
effect” on maintaining reform momentum, and also “substantially reduces the chance that the reform will collapse 
altogether”9). Collier states that up to US$250 million a year of TA can have a positive impact in the early years of 
transition. However, conversely, large amounts of non-TA aid will undermine the reform effort by disincentivizing 
DQGGLVWUDFWLQJUHIRUPHUVIURPWKHWDVNDWKDQG7KLVWKHQLVWKHµ¿QHOLQH¶WKDWGRQRUVDUHZDONLQJLQWKHLUHIIRUWV
to assist the transition process in Myanmar.
Overcoming the First International ‘Bottleneck’
After twenty-plus years of what was perceived to be stagnation and stalemate, in March 2011, the new President 
Thein Sein began implementing a vast array of reforms; political, social and economic. It soon became obvious 
that the President had chosen the “shock therapy” approach to reform, the rationale for which is that reformers are 
able to seize the political moment and overcome vested interests so as to maintain the momentum of the reform 
effort that is expected to lead to broad-based economic, political and social progress that will improve lives. The 
economic transition, away from the “Burmese Way to Socialism” and towards an open market economy, began 
more than twenty years ago, but still has a considerable way to go. The social transition, resolving the long-standing 
FRQÀLFWVEHWZHHQWKH%XUPDQPDMRULW\DQGWKHHWKQLFPLQRULWLHVDOVREHJDQWZHQW\\HDUVEXWKDV\HWWRUHDFKDQ\
lasting political settlements. The political transition is equally challenging. Whilst the East Asian model has been 
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generally characterised by political liberalisation only after economic liberalisation had enabled the country to 
achieve middle-income status, the Thein Sein government is attempting to reverse this trend. President Thein Sein 
has stated that his aim is to build a “modern, developed democratic nation”10).
Importantly, it has been clear from the outset that the government of Thein Sein seeks the removal of (pri-
marily US and EU) sanctions as a necessary component of their reform efforts. This means that certain reforms are 
carried out for dual purposes, one of which is to create an environment favourable for the removal of sanctions. 
It seems plausible to assume that the government of Myanmar view the sanctions as akin to a ‘bottleneck’ that is 
hindering the process of economic development in Myanmar. In this way, the removal of this ‘international bottle-
QHFN¶WKDWLVVHYHUHO\UHVWULFWLQJWKHLQÀRZRIUHVRXUFHVLVRISULPDU\LPSRUWDQFH,QGHHGLWLVWKH¿UVWYLWDOVWHS
and recognised as such by all stakeholders, both domestic and external.
,QWHUPVRIFRQFUHWHKLJKSUR¿OHUHIRUPVDODUJHQXPEHURISROLWLFDOSULVRQHUVZHUHUHOHDVHGLQ7KLV
was a long-time demand of the international community, and it was soon followed by a visit to Myanmar by US 
Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton. Also in September 2011, a National Human Rights Commission was established, 
consisting of retired academics, diplomats and civil servants. One month later, a new ILO-approved Trade Union 
Law was passed, allowing for the formation of unions and for the right to strike. In 2012, the government began 
to drastically reduce press censorship, while at the same time reducing restrictions on Internet access. In the words 
of long-time Myanmar scholar Robert Taylor there is, in general, a “more open approach to government”11). In the 
HFRQRPLF¿HOGWKHUHKDYHEHHQUHIRUPVRQDQWLFRUUXSWLRQFXUUHQF\H[FKDQJHIRUHLJQLQYHVWPHQWDQGWD[DWLRQ
)URP WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDOSHUVSHFWLYH WKHDUULYDO LQRI¿FHRI WKHQHZ863UHVLGHQW%DUDFN2EDPD LQ
brought new opportunities. The new President almost immediately ordered a review of US policy towards 
0\DQPDUDQGWKLVUHYLHZUHVXOWHGLQDVLJQL¿FDQWSROLF\VKLIW,WVHHPVWKDWWKLVSROLF\VKLIWZDVWKH¿UVWVLJQRI
ZKDWZRXOGODWHUEHFRPHWKHQHZ86SROLF\RI³UHEDODQFH´WRZDUGVWKH$VLD3DFL¿F0\DQPDUZRXOGLQHYLWDEO\
become a region in which the US could counter the ‘Rise of China’. This shift did not include the dropping of 
VDQFWLRQVEXWGLGLPSRUWDQWO\LQFOXGHWKHRSHQLQJRIGLDORJXH,QGHHGLWFRXOGEHVDLGWKDWWKH86KDG¿QDOO\DQG
adopted Japan’s long-advocated policy of constructive engagement12).
Through 2011, the international community responded cautiously to the reform enacted by President Thein 
6HLQ7KHUHDOµUXVKIRU0\DQPDU¶EHJDQDIWHU$XQJ6DQ6XX.\LZDVHOHFWHGWRRI¿FHLQWKHE\HOHFWLRQVRI$SULO
2012. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said of the elections,
“The results of the April 1st parliamentary by-elections represent a dramatic demonstration of popular will 
that brings a new generation of reformers into government. This is an important step in the country’s trans-
formation, which in recent months has seen the unprecedented release of political prisoners, new legislation 
EURDGHQLQJWKHULJKWVRISROLWLFDODQGFLYLFDVVRFLDWLRQDQGÀHGJOLQJSURFHVVLQLQWHUQDOGLDORJXHEHWZHHQWKH
government and ethnic minority groups.”
In May 2012, on the occasion of Myanmar’s Foreign Minister, Wunna Maung Lwin, visit to Washington, 
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6HFUHWDU\&OLQWRQDQQRXQFHGZKDWVKHWHUPHG³WKHPRVWVLJQL¿FDQWDGMXVWPHQWVWRRXUSUHYLRXVSROLF\WKDWKDYH
been taken to date”13)ZKLFKZDVVSHFL¿FDOO\UHIHUULQJWRWKHOLIWLQJRIVDQFWLRQVRQ$PHULFDQSULYDWHLQYHVWPHQWV
in Myanmar.
Also quickly following the 2012 by-election, the Japanese government announced it would cancel 303.5 billion 
yen, (about US$3.7 billion) of Myanmar’s debt to Japan. While the cancelation would be contingent on the joint 
monitoring of the continued progress towards reform in Myanmar over the following year, it allowed the Japanese 
government to disburse new ODA loans14). Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Japanese constructive engagement 
policy had included the promise of new ODA loans contingent on political and economic reform in Myanmar, and 
thus the cancellation of debt was equivalent to the lifting of Japanese economic sanctions against Myanmar.
The Council of the European Union announced on 23rd April 2012 that it would suspend sanctions/ restrictive 
measures on the government of Myanmar, “as a means to welcome and encourage the reform process”15). This 
would enable EU member states to dramatically expand their ODA efforts from humanitarian assistance to full-
scale development aid.
Therefore, in 2012, the international sanctions against Myanmar that had been steadily broadened and deep-
HQHGRYHUWKHWZHQW\SOXV\HDUVVLQFHWKH\KDG¿UVWEHJDQLQ¿QDOO\EHJDQWREHGLVPDQWOHG7KHSURFHVVRI
RYHUFRPLQJWKLV¿UVWLQWHUQDWLRQDOERWWOHQHFNKDGEHJXQ7KHUHZDVKRZHYHUDQRWKHUHTXDOO\LPSRUWDQWERWWOHQHFN
that had to be dealt with.
Overcoming the Second International ‘Bottleneck’
Even before it became clear that EU and US sanctions against Myanmar would be lifted, Japan began the process 
RIXQEORFNLQJWKHVHFRQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOERWWOHQHFNWKDWZDVKLQGHULQJWKHLQÀRZRIUHVRXUFHVWRVXSSRUWWKHWUDQVL-
tion in Myanmar. As previously outline, after the 2012 elections, Japan announced it would cancel a considerable 
portion of Myanmar’s outstanding debt. However, it was, at that time, only able to do that for Myanmar’s arrears 
that were owed to Japan. It was imperative that the issue of Myanmar’s debt to other donors, and in particular, to 
the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) was dealt with as soon as possible. This is because the IFIs cannot 
disburse new loans to a country that is in arrears, and Myanmar went into arrears in 1995. The debt issue was 
therefore, severely restricted the ability of the IFIs to support the reform process in Myanmar. In some ways, this 
VHFRQGERWWOHQHFNFDQEHYLHZHGDV0\DQPDU¶VVHOILQÀLFWHGVDQFWLRQEHFDXVHE\VXVSHQGLQJGHEWUHSD\PHQWVLW
essentially prohibited the disbursal of any new ODA loans. According to the Paris Club, Myanmar had $15.3 billion 
in foreign debt, $10.3 billion of which is owed to member states of the Paris Club. In January 2013, the Paris Club 
announced that it would cancel over US$5.5 billion of the total US$9.8 that was in arrears16). As previously outlined, 
in April 2012, Japan announced that it would cancel 127.4 billion yen in Myanmar’s outstanding debt, provided that 
the process of democratization continues. The Japanese government would monitor the process over the coming 
year, and in May 2013, it was announced that a further 176.1 billion yen of Myanmar’s debt would be cancelled in 
DFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHSUHYLRXV\HDU¶VDJUHHPHQW,WPXVWEHFRQFOXGHGWKDWWKH-DSDQHVHJRYHUQPHQWZDVVXI¿FLHQWO\
VDWLV¿HGZLWKWKHSURJUHVVRIUHIRUPFDUULHGRXWE\WKH0\DQPDUJRYHUQPHQWWKURXJK
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However, Japan was also working on the issue of Myanmar’s debt to the IFIs. In October 2012, after a Meeting 
for Myanmar held on the sidelines of the IMF/World Bank annual meeting in Tokyo, the Japanese government 
announced that it would also provide a $900 million bridge loan to Myanmar so that it can clear its arrears with 
the ADB and WB17). This would then open up the bottleneck and allow both IFIs to resume lending to Myanmar. 
As previously outline, since the late-1990s, Japan has been trying to use the lure of vast development loans to pry 
the Myanmar government away from its increasing dependence on China. In 1999, PM Obuchi offered Japanese 
DVVLVWDQFHWR0\DQPDU¶VHFRQRPLFUHIRUPVZKLFKOHGWRDÀXUU\RI-,&$IXQGHGGHYHORSPHQWVWXGLHV18). Known 
as the Myanmar Economic Structural Adjustment Program, the studies were carried out by groups of Burmese and 
-DSDQHVHH[SHUWVLQWKHIROORZLQJIRXUDUHDV¿VFDODQGPRQHWDU\SROLF\WUDGHDQGLQGXVWULDOSROLF\LQIRUPDWLRQ
and communications technology, and agriculture and rural economy. Part of this engagement process was a 2002 
agreement to cancel a portion of Myanmar’s debt to Japan. However, because of the 2003 Depayin incident and 
the removal of General Khin Nyunt, neither the recommendations of the development studies nor the agreement on 
debt cancellation were carried out. The 2003 debt agreement was incorporated into the April 2012 debt agreement.
Therefore, it seems evident that the Japanese government was proactively taking action to unblock the second 
international bottleneck to Myanmar’s economic development. Not only did Japan swiftly deal with Myanmar’s 
arrears to Japan, it also initiated the process that would cancel Myanmar’s arrears to the World Bank and Asian 
Development bank. The IFIs reengagement with the government of Myanmar then, was enabled and instigated by 
the Japanese government.
Japan
Japan has always followed a different approach to Myanmar than the US or the EU member states. Japan, being 
much more sensitive to the rise of China, has long recognized the geo-strategically important position of Myanmar. 
Added to this is the legacy of considerable Japanese ODA provided to Myanmar all through the Cold War. For 
these two reasons, Japan has been much more inclined to engage with the Myanmar government, and this was true 
in the 1990s and 2000s. The current Chief Representative of JICA in Myanmar, Masahiko Tanaka articulated the 
Japanese perspective in a November 19, 2012 article in the Myanmar Times5HÀHFWLQJRQWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKH
November visit to Myanmar of President Obama, Tanaka argued that US engagement would allow Myanmar to 
“break away from China”. Tanaka further went on to say that, due to the long history of Japanese aid to Myanmar, 
JICA is in an “extremely unique position in Myanmar as an international development agency”. It is indeed true 
that during the Cold War, Japan was the largest donor to Burma, and it is also true that during the sanctions era, 
WKH-,&$RI¿FHZDVE\IDUWKHODUJHVWGRQRUUHSUHVHQWDWLYHLQ<DQJRQ,WVHHPVOLNHO\WKDWWKHUHPD\H[LVWDZLGHO\
held belief that Japan has a special role to play in Myanmar’s transition. However, the special relationship between 
-DSDQDQG%XUPDGXULQJWKH&ROG:DUVXSSRVHGO\EDVHGRQVRPHLOOGH¿QHGFXOWXUDODI¿QLW\ZDVODUJHO\DP\WK
constructed by elites to further their political and economic interests. Having said that, as a result of years of Human 
5HVRXUFH'HYHORSPHQW6FKRODUVKLSVWKDW¿QDQFHWKHVWXG\RIIRUHLJQVWXGHQWVDWXQLYHUVLWLHVDQGRWKHUHGXFDWLRQDO
institutions in Japan, elite level connections between Japan and Myanmar certainly exist. Indeed, it is the expecta-
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tion of establishing such networks that provides the primary rationale for the Scholarship program. In the case of 
Myanmar, the Minister of Science and Technology is a graduate of Osaka University, the Minister of Education is 
a graduate of Hokkaido University, and the Rector of Yangon University and the Pro-Rector of Yangon Institute of 
7HFKQRORJ\DUHERWKJUDGXDWHVRI7RN\R8QLYHUVLW\$FFRUGLQJWRD-,&$RI¿FLDOLQ<DQJRQWKHUHDUHDOVRDODUJH
number of mid-level managers in public institutions that also have experience studying in Japan19). It is likely that 
no other donor can match this size of transnational elite-level network, although that stems merely from the fact 
that the Japanese Scholarship program was more extensive than others, and was running even during the sanction 
period. It is important though, that the existence of such a network is perceived by many within the Japanese ODA 
machinery as being evidence of a special relationship.
,Q¿VFDO\HDU±WKH-DSDQHVHJRYHUQPHQWFRPPLWWHGWRSURYLGH2'$WR0\DQPDUZRUWKRYHU86
million, which included US$500 million in concessional loans, and US$200 million in grant aid and technical as-
sistance.
At the previously outlined Japan-Myanmar Summit that took place on the sidelines of the Fourth Mekong-
japan Summit Meeting on April 21, 2012, the Japanese government announced two new ODA grant projects 
for Myanmar. One was a Project for Mangrove Rehabilitation Plan for Enhancement of Disaster Prevention in 
Ayeyawady Delta, which totaled 583 million yen. The second was a Project for Human Resource Development 
6FKRODUVKLSZKLFKWRWDOHGPLOOLRQ\HQ$FFRUGLQJWR-,&$WKLVZDVWKH¿UVWVWHSLQZKDWZRXOGEHDFRQVLGHU-
able expansion of the scholarship program20)8SRQFRPSOHWLRQRIWKHLUVWXGLHVWKHVHRI¿FHUVZRXOGWKHQUHWXUQ
to Myanmar and “support market-oriented economic reform”. Also, in April 2012, the Japanese government an-
nounced that it would extend grant aid of 814 million yen through the World Food Programme (WFP) for food aid 
to Ethnic Minority Areas in the Magway region of Central Myanmar.
In September 2012, JICA provided support to a seminar that was jointly organized by the Ministry of National 
Planning and Economic Development of Myanmar, and the Ministry of Planning and Investment of Vietnam. It 
seems likely that JICAs support for this seminar is based on an understanding that elements of the Myanmar gov-
Figure  2: Japanese ODA to Myanmar, 1980–2011 (Net ODA, US$ millions current prices)
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ernment will be more receptive to advice from a fellow developing country. JICA is also conducting workshops in 
7KDLODQGZKHUHRI¿FLDOVIURP0\DQPDUVWXG\DORQJVLGHWKHLUFRXQWHUSDUWVIURPRWKHU6RXWK(DVW$VLDQFRXQWULHV
It seems that JICA regard such South-south cooperation as both worthwhile, and an area in which they have some 
advantage over other donors21). Another example of JICA technical assistance to Myanmar is the October 2012 
Seminar on Reforming Legal Systems of Public Company and Corporate Governance, co-sponsored by JICA and 
WKH8QLRQ$WWRUQH\*HQHUDO¶V2I¿FH/DZ\HUVDQG/HJDOVFKRODUVIURP-DSDQSDUWLFLSDWHGLQWKHVHPLQDUDVGLG
Burmese bureaucrats.
For the Japanese government, if 2012 was the year of overcoming the debt bottleneck, then 2013 was the 
year to start capitalizing on such efforts. On May 26, 2013, Japan and Myanmar exchanged notes on two projects 
both of which relate to the water supply of Yangon city. On the same day, three new Yen Loans, totaling 51.052 
billion yen, were announced. One of these was a Regional Development Project for Poverty Reduction, the aim of 
which was to build and upgrade infrastructure across Myanmar. The second project was for the rehabilitation of 
thermal power stations and substations in the Yangon area. The third loan was connected with the Thilawa Special 
Economic Zone, which is located south of Yangon. Just the day before, on May 25, a consortium of Japanese 
private companies (including Mitsubishi, Marubeni and Sumitomo) signed a MoU with the Union of Myanmar 
Federation of Chambers of Commerce (UMFCCI) on the joint development of the Thilawa SEZ. Japanese Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe was visiting Myanmar at this time, and was present at the signing22). The Prime Minister 
RI-DSDQZDVSXWWLQJWKHIXOOZHLJKWRIKLVRI¿FHEHKLQGWKLVSURMHFW%DFNLQ$SULODWWKHVDPHWLPHDVWKH
Japanese government agreed to cancel a large proportion of Myanmar’s outstanding debt, Prime Minister Abe, 
along with his Myanmar counterpart signed a Memorandum of Intent on the Cooperation for the Development of 
the Master Plan for the Thilawa. The Yen Loan was a very concessional, in that interest was just 0.01% p.a., with a 
repayment period of 40 years. The Loan was also untied, meaning that the Myanmar government is not restricted 
to procuring goods and services from Japanese private companies. However, in August 2013, it was announced 
that Itochu Corporation would build a bridge across the Bago River connecting Yangon with the Thilawa SEZ23).
It was also announced that Marubeni Corporation would be involved in electricity generation, upgrading railroads 
and other infrastructure projects connected with the Thilawa SEZ. Both Itochu and Marubeni have long histories 
RIEHLQJLQYROYHGLQ2'$¿QDQFHGGHYHORSPHQWSURMHFWV7KHSUHYLRXV\HDULQ2FWREHUWKH-DSDQ([WHUQDO7UDGH
Organization (JETRO) and the Japan Myanmar Association organized a seminar and site tour of the Thilawa SEZ 
in Yangon. Representatives of 160 Japanese companies attended, as did senior members of the Myanmar govern-
ment24). From the traditional analysis of Japanese ODA, the Thilawa SEZ is a classic example of the use of public 
¿QDQFHWRXQGHUSLQWKHSULYDWHLQYHVWPHQWVRI-DSDQHVHFRUSRUDWLRQV7UDGLWLRQDOO\WKHchusha seido, or ‘injection 
V\VWHP¶LQZKLFK-DSDQHVHFRUSRUDWLRQVDUHWKHLQVWLJDWRUVRI2'$¿QDQFHGGHYHORSPHQWSURMHFWV25) resulted in a 
situation whereby, “the source for almost all project proposals for yen loans from developing countries is overseas 
EUDQFKHVRI-DSDQHVHEXVLQHVV¿UPV´26). While this was mostly put forward as a criticism of the system of Japanese 
ODA, there is much more acceptance of private-public cooperation in development in the 21st century than there 
was in the 20th century.
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Also, in May 2013, it was announced that a further 456 million yen would be provided in Grant aid for Human 
5HVRXUFH'HYHORSPHQW6FKRODUVKLSV7KLVZDVDOPRVWGRXEOHWKH¿JXUHIRU$VSUHYLRXVO\VWDWHGWKHDG-
PLQLVWUDWLYHRI¿FHUVIURP0\DQPDUZKRVWXG\LQ-DSDQDUH³H[SHFWHGWRFRQWULEXWHWRWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIPXWXDO
understanding and friendly relationship between Japan and Myanmar”27).
Figure  3 clearly shows the response of the Japanese government to the opening up of Myanmar. It shows the 
new ODA agreements that have been signed between the governments of Japan and Myanmar between the years 
of 2010 and 2013. Although this graph does not show Japanese efforts on the multilateral level, the evidence of 
Japan’s bilateral efforts are incontrovertible.
World Bank
The World Bank had made no new loans to Myanmar since 1987, and in 1998, the government of Myanmar went 
into arrears. It was thus necessary to clear these arrears (US$406.5 million as of August 2012) before any new 
lending could begin. However, this was not the only restriction on World Bank lending to Myanmar. Because 
Figure  3: Japanese ODA to Myanmar, 2010–2013 (Exchange of Notes, billion yen)
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the distribution of voting power at the Bank is according to the size of the member state’s economy, the US and 
EU states could effectively reinforce their bilateral/multilateral sanctions by blocking any Bank cooperation 
with Myanmar. Furthermore, the “Washington Consensus”, and the associated conditionalities, provided another 
foundation for reinforcing non-cooperation with the Myanmar government. An example of this is the fact that 
Myanmar was excluded from the HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) Initiative. Myanmar did not qualify for 
the Initiative because it could not meet the entry requirements: compliance with economic (and political) reform 
conditions28). Figure  5 shows the dramatic fall in World Bank lending to Myanmar in 1990. It also shows the zero 
OHYHORIDLGIURPXQWLO7KHPLQXVEHWZHHQ±UHÀHFWVWKHFRQWLQXHGUHSD\PHQWRIGHEWEHIRUH
going into arrears in 1998.
As an attempt to overcome the constraints under which the World Bank was operating vis-à-vis Myanmar, 
in February 2012, the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) began a project that provided 
£750,000 in “Support to the International Financial Institutions to conduct work on the economic opportunities 
and challenges for Burma”29). Recognizing both the opportunity (as a result of the reforms) and the constraints (on 
WKHRSHUDWLRQVRIWKH:%WKDWUHPDLQHGDVDUHVXOWRIWKHVDQFWLRQVDQGWKHDUUHDUV'),'¿QDQFHGD:RUOG%DQN
study on the economy of Myanmar, the results of which would become a public good. “Because of Burma’s human 
rights record and its debt arrears, IFI engagement is currently limited and the IFIs are not able to work directly with 
Government.” It was thus the case that it was not just the Japanese government that was attempting to facilitate 
the operations of the IFIs in Myanmar. Elements of the UK government too were attempting to circumvent their 
own sanctions and nudge the IFIs into action in Myanmar. A few months later, in August 2012, the World Bank 
DQQRXQFHGLWVLQWHQWLRQWRRSHQDQHZRI¿FHLQ<DQJRQDQGWKLVZDVWKHEHJLQQLQJRILWVIRUPDOUHHQJDJHPHQWZLWK
the government of Myanmar.
In November 2012, the Executive Directors of the World Bank approved a grant of US$80 million for the 
National Community Driven Development Project for Myanmar. Importantly, approval for this project was given 
before Myanmar had cleared its arrears with the World Bank. The Bank has trust funds which it administers inde-
Figure  4: World Bank (IDA) ODA to Myanmar, 1980–2011 (Net ODA, US$ millions current prices)
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pendently of the capital provided by member states. These trust funds, the State and Peacebuilding Fund and the 
Korea Trust Fund for Economic and Peace-building Transitions) allow the Bank to fund programs even in countries 
that are in arrears. A total of 14 townships, one in each of the administrative states and divisions of Myanmar, would 
participate in this project, which would begin in January 2013 and run through to January 2019. As of May 2013, 
three townships had been selected in the Tanintharyi Division, the Shan State and the Chin State. The townships 
were selected by the government through a process that began with consultations and workshops that brought to-
gether various stakeholders. These workshops drew up short lists of potential townships from which the government 
selected one from each region. Five more townships will be selected in 2014. The rationale for providing this grant, 
prior to the clearance of arrears, was to support “an urgent government priority critical to the success of Myanmar’s 
triple transition—moving from top-down decision making to participatory approaches and bottom up planning”30).
This illustrates the imperative of the donor community to support the Myanmar government in providing the popu-
ODFHZLWKWDQJLEOHEHQH¿WV6XFKWDQJLEOHEHQH¿WVZLOOJHQHUDWHIXUWKHUVXSSRUWIRUUHIRUPVDPRQJWKHSRSXODWLRQ
which will in turn undermine any counter-reform initiative. This represents a paradigm shift in the perspective of 
the World Bank towards Myanmar, and is just another example of the positive response that Myanmar’s ongo-
ing reforms evoked from the international donor community. Importantly, projects such as this will be held up as 
ÀDJVKLSSURMHFWVRIWKH%DQN¶VHDUO\HQJDJHPHQWZLWKWKHJRYHUQPHQWRI0\DQPDUDQGLWVVXSSRUWIRUWKHUHIRUP
process. Because of this, the Bank is playing a two-level game of supporting the government of Myanmar, whilst 
at the same time, following its own standards and norms and satisfying its own set of stakeholders.
In its Interim Strategy Note (ISN) for FY2013–14, the World Bank stated that it would focus on supporting 
“national efforts to rebuild and transform Myanmar’s institutions”31). However, recognizing that transforming in-
VWLWXWLRQVWDNHVWLPHWKH%DQNZLOODOVRIRFXVRQEXLOGLQJFRQ¿GHQFHLQWKHUHIRUPSURFHVVDQGWKLVLVWKHUDWLRQDOH
behind the previously outlined National Community Driven Development Project. According to the ISN, the World 
Bank will also provide technical assistance to support the economic reform process.
In December 2012, the International Development Association (IDA) proposed an IDA Credit of US$440 mil-
lion to support Development Policy Operation (DPO). The objectives were twofold: to support Myanmar’s reforms 
and to assist in the clearing of Myanmar’s arrears. The Bank, jointly with the IMF, had carried out a debt sustain-
ability analysis and determined that Myanmar was in debt distress, but that also, were the arrears to be cleared, 
Myanmar would be at low risk of debt distress, meaning that total debt is not at an unsustainable level. In January 
86PLOOLRQRIWKLV'32ZDVGLVEXUVHGWKXVSURYLGLQJWKH¿QDQFLQJIRUWKHFOHDULQJRI0\DQPDU¶V
arrears to the IDA.
In September 2013 the Board of the World Bank approved the Electric Power Project for Myanmar, the 
purpose of which is to increase electricity generation in Myanmar. Power generation and power infrastructure 
are important bottlenecks, and it is estimated that 20–30% of the country is covered by the electricity grid. The 
Bank project will begin with the upgrading of gas turbines at the Thaton Gas Turbine station in Mon State. The 
Environmental and Social Assessment Report for this project, published in August 2013, highlights one of the key 
challenges for the international donor community.
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“A lack of legal requirements and limited institutional capacity for ensuring effective safeguard preparation 
DQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQLQLQIUDVWUXFWXUHSURMHFWVLVRQHRIPDMRUKXUGOHVIRULQWHUQDWLRQDO¿QDQFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQV
and responsible investors in Myanmar.”32)
6RWKH:RUOG%DQNLVWU\LQJWRXQGHUWDNHUHODWLYHO\ODUJHVFDOHLQIUDVWUXFWXUHSURMHFWVZLWKWKHVSHFL¿HGDLP
of supporting the reform process, despite recognizing that legal frameworks and institutional capacity are far below 
its own operating standards. The report further states that of a list of 10 World Bank Safeguard Policies (a list of 
policy areas that, being especially vulnerable to negative impacts from development projects, must be safeguarded 
against), one concerning indigenous peoples will be triggered33). Such a prediction will place the Bank in the same 
territory as the Chinese builders of the controversial Myitsone Dam that was suspended by President Thein Sein 
in September 2011, in response to the “the people’s will”, or the Monywa Copper Mine, that was once owned by 
Canadian Mining company Ivanhoe Mines. Both these projects have generated considerable resistance and negative 
publicity due to the environmental and social impacts. Through development projects such as this, the World Bank 
will be jointly, implementing a development project, and attempting to raise the Myanmar government’s operat-
ing standards to that approaching the global standard. Having said that, it must surely be the case that Myanmar 
is not alone in being in such a situation, and it must also be the case that the World Bank has considerable experi-
ence of operating under such conditions. What is perhaps unusual is the extraordinarily high level of attention that 
Myanmar is receiving, not only from the international donor and business community, but also from the global 
PDVVPHGLDDQGWUDQVQDWLRQDOFLYLOVRFLHW\QHWZRUNV$VDÀDJVKLSSURMHFWRIWKHQDVFHQWUHHQJDJHPHQWEHWZHHQ
the World Bank and the government of Myanmar, the Electric Power Project will be especially scrutinized by the 
global community.
The World Bank is supporting the Peace Donor Support Group, along with Norway, Australia, the UK, the 
EU, the UN, the US, Japan and Switzerland. The Group is part of the overall Myanmar Peace Support Initiative 
Figure  5: World Bank (IRBD and IDA) commitments to Myanmar (US$ millions)
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ZKLFKLVD1RUZHJLDQOHGLQLWLDWLYHWRVXSSRUWWKHFHDVH¿UHV7KH0\DQPDU3HDFH&HQWUHWKHWKHVHFUHWDULDWIRU
WKLVLQLWLDWLYHLVKHDGHGE\$XQJ0LQD0LQLVWHULQWKH3UHVLGHQW¶V2I¿FHDQGUXQE\6RH7KHLQ3UHVLGHQW¶V2I¿FH
Minister) and Khin Ye (Home Affairs Minister). Supporting the peace process was one of the stated aims of the 
October 2012 ISN34), and the previously outlined National Community Driven Development Project is presumably 
RQHHIIRUW³WRSURPRWHSHDFHLQFOXGLQJE\JHQHUDWLQJDWDQJLEOHSHDFHGLYLGHQGIRUFRQÀLFWDIIHFWHGFRPPXQL-
ties”35). Japan too, is providing considerable support for the Myanmar Peace Centre. In March 2013, the Japanese 
JRYHUQPHQWSURYLGHGD86PLOOLRQJUDQWDQGWKH1LSSRQ)RXQGDWLRQLVDPDMRU¿QDQFLHU,QGHHGLQ)HEUXDU\
2013, the Japanese government appointed Sasakawa Yohei, Chairman of the Nippon Foundation, as Special Envoy 
of the Government of Japan for National Reconciliation in Myanmar36).
7KHQHZ:RUOG%DQN<DQJRQRI¿FHZKLFKLQFOXGHVWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO)LQDQFH&RUSRUDWLRQRSHQHGLQ0D\
2013. There are a total of about 30 employees, which includes 10 foreign experts.
Figure  6 shows the dramatic increase in World Bank commitments to Myanmar from its level of zero in 2010– 
2012, to over US$500 million in 2013.
Asian Development Bank
The Asian Development Bank (ADB), like the World Bank, agreed to no new loans or technical assistance after 
1987. However, some loans agreed to before that time have continued to be disbursed. Cumulative lending to 
Myanmar had amounted to $530.9 million for 32 loans (corresponding to 28 projects) by 2005. Of this $530.9 
million, $411.8 million has been disbursed. The graph in Figure  7 is remarkably similar to Figure  5 that shows 
ODA to Myanmar from the World Bank. It shows the dramatic fall in ADB lending to Myanmar in 1990. It also 
shows the zero level of aid from 1992 until 2010. As was also the case with the World Bank, the minus between 
±UHÀHFWVWKHFRQWLQXHGUHSD\PHQWRIGHEWEHIRUH0\DQPDUZHQWLQWRDUUHDUVLQ
Like the Interim Strategy Paper of the World Bank, in October 2012, the ABD published an Interim Country 
Partnership Strategy (2012–2014) that outlined its framework for full resumption of operations in Myanmar. 
According to the strategy, the ADB will focus on the following three objectives: human and institutional capacity 
Figure  6: ADB ODA to Myanmar, 1980–2011 (Total ODA, US$ millions current prices)
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building, “an enabling economic environment”, and infrastructure and rural development. In line perhaps with the 
recommendations as previously outline by the economist Paul Collier, the ADB is beginning its reengagement with 
Myanmar with a substantial effort of Technical Assistance.
In the second half of 2012 alone, the ADB approved US$5.4 million worth of 12 technical assistance (TA) 
projects, “for policy advisory, capacity development, and institutional strengthening in some critical areas”37). The 
WZRPDMRU7$SURMHFWVGXULQJZHUHIRU&DSDFLW\%XLOGLQJ6XSSRUWIRU3URMHFW,GHQWL¿FDWLRQ86PLO-
lion) and Capacity Development and Institutional Support (US$1.5 million), both approved in December 2012. 
The TA for Capacity Development and Institutional Support will focus on civil servants in government ministries 
and related public companies. The executing agency will be the Ministry of National Planning and Economic 
Development (MNPED), and a sub-committee under the government’s Aid Management Working Committee that 
coordinates TA activities will select participants for the various components (seminars, workshops, etc.) of this TA 
support. International advisers will also be placed in key ministries.
7KH VHFRQG 86 PLOOLRQ 7$ SURMHFW ZDV IRU &DSDFLW\ %XLOGLQJ 6XSSRUW IRU 3URMHFW ,GHQWL¿FDWLRQ
Recognizing the need to raise the capacity of public civil servants to prioritize potential projects, identify feasible 
investment projects and prepare pre-feasibility analysis of pilot projects in the four key sectors of transport, energy, 
water supply and other municipal services and agriculture and natural resources. According to the ADB, “these 
VHFWRUVKDYHEHHQLGHQWL¿HGEDVHGRQWKHH[SUHVVHGSULRULWLHVRIWKHJRYHUQPHQWDQGWKHUHVXOWVRIWKHSUHOLPLQDU\
assessments, strategies, and road maps conducted by ADB staff”38). Needles to say, the inability of civil servants 
to identify and implement projects will become a serious bottleneck that will impede growth and slow the reform 
effort.
As of October 2013, a further 11 projects had been approved for 2013. Of these 11 projects, 10 were for 
technical assistance, and one was a highly concessional (1–1.5% interest) US$575.5 million loan. The Support for 
0\DQPDU¶V5HIRUPVIRU,QFOXVLYH*URZWKZDVDQ$VLDQ'HYHORSPHQW)XQG¿QDQFHGSROLF\EDVHGORDQ3%/WR
Figure  7: ADB Technical Assistance to Myanmar (Approved, US$ millions)
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support Myanmar’s re-engagement with global markets. According to the ADB, the PBL “covers policy reform 
accomplishments from August 2011 to December 2012”, and it can thus be interpreted as being a reward for past 
DFFRPSOLVKPHQWV,PSRUWDQWO\WKHVSHFL¿FSXUSRVHRIWKLV3%/LVWRDVVLVWWKHJRYHUQPHQWRI0\DQPDULQUHSD\LQJ
WKHSUHYLRXVO\RXWOLQHG2FWREHU-DSDQHVH¿QDQFHGEULGJHORDQWKDWDOORZHGWKH0\DQPDUJRYHUQPHQWWRFOHDU
its arrears to the World Bank and ADB. Importantly too, the ADB implemented a waiver to its policy that allows 
no loans to a borrower with arrears, so as to minimize the tenure of the Japanese bridge loan. This meant that the 
Japanese government and the two potentially most important multilateral donors for Myanmar went to considerable 
lengths to coordinate their efforts to reward and assist in Myanmar’s reforms.
In recognition of past mistakes, especially with reference to Cambodia, the ADB is planning on taking a long-
term approach to capacity building in Myanmar. Whilst the standard project cycle for TA does not allow for this, 
WKH$'%LVLQWKHSUHOLPLQDU\VWDJHVRISODQQLQJDWZRSURQJDSSURDFK7KH¿UVWSURQJEHJLQQLQJLQ±ZLOO
include the traditional dispatch of experts to ministries. The second prong will be the long-term focus on education, 
utilizing the internal mechanisms that are already in place. The current plan seems to be for creating a new type of 
7$WKDWZLOOEHPXFKPRUHÀH[LEOHWRUHFLSLHQWQHHGV39). The plan has been formalized in the Long-Term Capacity 
Building for Civil Servants and Institutional Development project that was proposed in July 2013. Amounting to 
86PLOOLRQDQGIXQGHGWKURXJKWKH7HFKQLFDO$VVLVWDQFH6SHFLDO)XQGWKLV7$ZLOO¿QDQFHWKH¿UVWWKUHH\HDUV
of a 10-year vision for capacity building in Myanmar. This project will establish a Forum that will act as the “long-
term capacity development body”40)7KLVLVWKH¿UVWWLPHWKDWWKH$'%KDVIRUPDOO\DGRSWHGDORQJWHUPDSSURDFK
WR&DSDFLW\%XLOGLQJDQGLWZLOOWKXVEHVHHQDVVRPHWKLQJRIDÀDJVKLSRI$'%DLGWR0\DQPDU,WFRXOGDOVR
become a model for long-term capacity building in countries in transition.
As a complementary project to the previously outlined long-term capacity building project, approved in June 
2013 was a US$1.8 million TA project to Support Post-Primary Education Development. Utilizing a US$0.5 mil-
lion grant from Australia, the Policy and Advisory Technical Assistance (PATA) will directly support Myanmar’s 
Comprehensive Education Sector Review, which is a Ministry of Education-led review of the entire education 
sector in Myanmar. Education reform is a particularly hot issue because of the involvement of Aung San Suu Kyi 
as the head of the Parliament Higher Education Law Committee. Running in parallel to the Ministry of Education-
led review, the National League for Democracy has drafted a new education policy proposal that was submitted to 
parliament in the summer of 2013. According to a member of the NLD Education Committee, there may exist a 
considerable gap between those recommendations of the NLD and those favored by the Minister of Education41).
Another example of ADB TA is the July 2013 US$1.525 million TA project for Design of e-Governance 
Master Plan and Review of Information and Communication Technology Capacity in Academic Institutions. 
Utilizing US$0.5 million in TA from the People’s Republic of China, this project will create a common framework 
IRU,&7V\VWHPVLQJRYHUQPHQWPLQLVWULHV*LYHQWKHFRQVLGHUDEOHLQÀRZRIGRQRUVLQWR0\DQPDUVLQFHWKH
$'%VHHPVWRKDYHLGHQWL¿HGWKHSRWHQWLDOIRUZDVWHDQGGXSOLFDWLRQLQWKHSURYLVLRQRI,&7V\VWHPV1HHGOHVV
to say, this is an attempt to coordinate donor activity in line with the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 
which called greater harmonization between donors so as to reduce the burden on recipients.
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Importantly, Japan has been working not just on bilateral ODA projects to Myanmar. Of the 10 TA projects 
approved for 2013 (up until October) four are funded by the Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR). These four 
amounted to US$5.9 million, about half of the total for 2013. “The administration of JFPR projects does not fol-
low standard ADB processes. The projects require approval by the Japanese embassy at the concept stage and by 
WKH*RYHUQPHQWRI-DSDQDWWKH¿QDOGHVLJQVWDJH´42). From this, it seems plausible to conclude that the govern-
ment of Japan is taking all possible measures to maximize its potential input on the reform process in Myanmar. 
According to the ADB,
³-)35JUDQWVDUHQRWIRUWHFKQLFDODVVLVWDQFH7$EXWDUHWR¿QDQFHLQYHVWPHQWJUDQWVOLQNHGWR$'%ORDQV
to pilot test innovative poverty reduction approaches that may later be up-scaled under loan conditions and 
mainstreamed in ADB operations. It provides opportunities for ADB to work more directly with civil society, 
such as non government organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations, and with communities 
themselves.”43)
6XFKJUDQWVDUHLQWHQGHGWRSURYLGHWKH$'%ZLWKÀH[LELOLW\WRWHVW³LQQRYDWLYHDSSURDFKHV´DQGLWVHHPV
that Myanmar’s transition is the testing ground.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that Myanmar is in a ‘transition moment’; a time of great change in which widespread reforms 
will dramatically change all aspects of the state and the nation. There is also no doubt that the Japanese government 
and ODA bureaucracy hold the opinion that Japan is especially well placed to support Myanmar’s transition. This 
perspective is supported by the evidence presented here on Japan’s proactive approach to dealing with Myanmar’s 
outstanding debt. Japan’s efforts resulted in surmounting the second international bottleneck. It is also supported 
E\WKH¿JXUHVUHJDUGLQJ-DSDQ¶VELODWHUDO2'$FRPPLWPHQWVLQ±
The reform efforts of President Thein Sein have convinced the international community of his sincerity, and 
the international community has responded by suspending/lifting sanctions against Myanmar. However, it will take 
time for the sanctions to be completely removed. In the case of US sanctions for example, President Obama was 
renewing the JADE act (barring imports from Myanmar to the US, even through third countries), while at the same 
time, following a constructive engagement policy. Many of the US sanctions have been made in Congress, and it is 
here that they will need to be unmade. Likewise, EU sanctions have been formally suspended.
Japan has been waiting for its chance to continue its economic cooperation with Myanmar. Because of the 
long-term underdevelopment of the Myanmar economy that was a cause of the political crisis of 1988, and because 
of the inability of Myanmar to repay its ODA debt to Japan, it must be concluded that Japan-Myanmar economic 
cooperation during the Cold War was a failure. However, this resulted from the fundamental incompatibility of the 
Burmese Way to Socialism and the Japanese model of keizai kyoryoku (economic cooperation), which was intended 
to penetrate overseas markets and capture resources, both of which the Burmese Way to Socialism was intended to 
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prevent. Having said that, the Thein Sein model of development is based on an open economy that is much more 
conducive to Japanese economic cooperation. However, it remains to be seen whether the Japanese public-private 
ODA model will withstand the scrutiny of the open society that Thein Sein also intends to create.
Both the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank will play key roles in the international effort to sup-
port Myanmar’s transition. Both Banks, but especially the ADB, have responded positively to the reform efforts 
of Thein Sein. Both seem to be using all the tools available to provide whatever support they can to the reform 
process, although it remains to be seen whether both Banks are also equally aware of the dangers of overwhelming 
the Myanmar government. It seems likely that both Banks, and other ODA donors too, see Myanmar’s transition 
as the testing ground for new ideas and new models, the success or failure of which will be used to judge them, as 
well as Myanmar.
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